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AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF 
STRICT SCRUTINY 
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I 
INTRODUCTION 
The story of the United States Supreme Court’s epochal 1954 ruling in 
Brown v. Board of Education1 and the legal struggle for civil rights led by the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) dur-
ing the decade following World War II occupies a central place in many Ameri-
cans’ understanding both of the history of democracy in the United States and 
of the African American experience.  Under the direction of Chief Counsel 
Thurgood Marshall, the NAACP’s Legal Defense and Education Fund and al-
lied attorneys brought a series of civil rights cases before the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  Its campaign culminated triumphantly in Brown and its companion case 
Bolling v. Sharpe,2 in which the Court struck down school segregation. 
It was in the Bolling case that the Court clearly and definitively established 
its doctrine of “strict scrutiny.”  According to this doctrine, race was a “suspect 
classification” under the Constitution, meaning that the Court would subject 
any action by the government that involved a racial classification to a searching 
examination, rather than assume its constitutionality, and that it would hold the 
action to be unconstitutional unless it served a compelling state interest and was 
narrowly tailored to meet that interest.  The Court’s doctrine of strict scrutiny 
removed the constitutional underpinnings of Jim Crow and thus paved the way 
for its subsequent civil rights decisions during the 1960s. 
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One crucial element of the story of Brown v. Board of Education and the 
battle for black equality has been obscured in the popular narrative:  the role of 
the Nisei, U.S. citizens of Japanese ancestry, in the legal struggle leading up to 
Brown.  The Nisei contribution took different forms:  For example, lawyers for 
the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) consulted on different occa-
sions with NAACP counsel on the preparation of civil rights cases before the 
Supreme Court and lower courts, and the JACL participated in these cases as 
amicus curiae.  Beyond the force of their arguments, the presence of the Nisei 
alongside African Americans served a powerful symbolic function, particularly 
in the decade following their mass wartime removal and incarceration (com-
monly called the Japanese American internment).  It operated to remind both 
judges and the nation that racial prejudice was not simply a “black problem,” 
but a complex phenomenon of global dimensions, and of the dangerous conse-
quences of race-based legislation. 
However, the most decisive contribution of the Japanese Americans to the 
legal struggle for civil rights was in laying the foundation for the doctrine of 
strict scrutiny on which Brown and the other cases were based.  The doctrine 
was developed in significant part from principles first enunciated in the cases 
involving Japanese American challenges to their wartime incarceration.  These 
principles were then elaborated and reinforced immediately after World War II 
in a set of cases brought by the JACL concerning the rights of Japanese Ameri-
cans to live and work free of discriminatory restrictions.  In the years that fol-
lowed, the NAACP built upon these cases in its fight against segregation, and 
the Court finally absorbed and explicitly enshrined the principles first enunci-
ated in those cases. 
II 
THE WARTIME JAPANESE AMERICAN CASES 
A. Hirabayashi v. United States 
The story of Japanese Americans and strict scrutiny begins with Hirabayashi 
v. United States3 and Korematsu v. United States.4  In these cases, the Court justi-
fied its upholding of race-based restrictions on American citizens of Japanese 
ancestry on the grounds of the exceptional demands of wartime military neces-
sity.  In the case of Hirabayashi and its companion case Yasui v. United States,5 
 
 3. 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
 4. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).  See Daniel Sabbagh, “Généologie du principe de color-blindness” in 
L’EGALITE PAR LE DROIT: LES PARADOXES DE LA DISCRIMINATION POSITIVE AUX ÉTATS-UNIS, 165 
(2003).  For a discussion of Korematsu and the origins of strict scrutiny, see Michael Klarman, “An In-
terpretive History of Modern Equal Protection,” 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 213-62 (1991); Reggie Oh and 
Frank Wu, “The Evolution of Race in the Law: The Supreme Court Moves From Approving Internment 
of Japanese Americans to Disapproving Affirmative Action for African Americans,” 1 MICH. J. RACE & 
L. 165, 165-93 (1996); Neil Gotanda, “The Story of Korematsu: The Japanese-American Cases,” in 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES, 270-72 (Michael C. Dorf, ed., 2004). 
 5. 320 U.S. 115 (1943). 
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the Court sanctioned a special curfew for Japanese Americans.  Engaging in 
some judicial hairsplitting, the Court considered this question separately from 
the mass removal and confinement that followed, which it refused to address.  
Chief Justice Harlan Stone, in order to underline the exceptional nature of the 
action, wrote that as a general rule, “Distinctions between citizens solely be-
cause of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose 
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.  For that reason, legisla-
tive classification or discrimination based on race alone has often been held to 
be a denial of equal protection.”6  The urgency of the war emergency made 
race-based classification imperative.  However, Stone was writing for a unani-
mous court and kept his discussion of the issues involved in the case to a mini-
mum to avoid dissents.  As it was, Justice Frank Murphy strongly objected to 
the race-based curfew and circulated a dissent, which he was persuaded only 
under great pressure to transform into a concurrence in order to preserve una-
nimity.7 
B. Korematsu v. United States 
The Korematsu case involved the right of the Army to undertake the mass 
removal of American citizens of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast.  Once 
again, the majority of the Court chose to frame the issue simply as evacuation, 
isolated from the consequent confinement of Japanese Americans.  Neverthe-
less, the Court split on the decision. In a ringing dissent, Justice Murphy 
charged that the Court’s action amounted to “a legalization of racism.”8  This 
clearly stung the author of the majority opinion, Justice Hugo Black, a South-
erner sensitive to the question of racial discrimination.9  Black vigorously re-
jected any suggestion that racism had guided either the Court or the officials re-
sponsible for evacuation:  “To cast this case,” he insisted, “into outlines of racial 
prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers which were presented, 
merely confuses the issue.”10  Still, to buttress his conclusion, Black felt com-
pelled to add to his original draft opinion some preliminary language distin-
guishing the case and justifying the extraordinary military urgency that led the 
Court to its ruling: 
It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights 
of a single racial group are immediately suspect.  That is not to say that all such restric-
 
 6. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).  Stone himself seems to have been un-
happy about the government’s treatment of Japanese Americans and even wrote privately that it was 
difficult to reconcile with any concept of civil liberties.  GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE 
PRESIDENT: FDR AND THE INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE AMERICANS 190 (2001). 
 7. PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN INTERNMENT 
CASES 242-50 (1993). 
 8. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 242.  For Murphy’s impact on shaping Fifth Amendment protections, 
see Matthew J. Perry, “Justice Murphy and The Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Doctrine: A Contri-
bution Unrecognized,” 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 243, 266-79 (2000). 
 9. For Black’s opinion in Korematsu and his views on racial matters see ROGER K. NEWMAN, 
HUGO BLACK 313-17 (1994). 
 10. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223. 
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tions are unconstitutional.  It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid 
scrutiny.  Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restric-
tions; racial antagonism never can.11 
This belatedly inserted and somewhat defensive passage may well have been 
considered dicta by the justices.12  In that sense it resembled the first mention in 
the opinions of the Court of the idea of a privileged level of scrutiny for legisla-
tion in the area of minority rights.  In footnote four of his opinion in the 1938 
case United States v. Carolene Products Co, Justice Stone had noted that legisla-
tion involving racial minority groups or other “discrete and insular minorities” 
might well be subjected to “more exacting judicial scrutiny.”13  Later, in the 1942 
case Skinner v. State of Oklahoma Ex. Rel. Willimson, the Court had stated that 
“strict scrutiny” of legislative classifications was necessary in the case of basic 
civil rights, although this did not involve a racial classification but one of differ-
ent classes of felons.14  Nevertheless, the Court did not further mention such a 
doctrine or cite these passages in civil rights cases such as Morgan v. Virginia15 
during the immediate postwar years.16  This would change as Japanese Ameri-
cans became engaged in the issue of equal rights to residence, both through 
their efforts to fight the California Alien Land Act and through their participa-
tion in the larger multigroup struggle against restrictive covenants. 
III 
THE OYAMA CASE 
A. The Alien Land Act 
California’s Alien Land Act, originally enacted in 1913, barred all “aliens 
ineligible to citizenship” from owning, acquiring, leasing, occupying, or transfer-
ring agricultural land.  The law, which soon inspired similar statutes in other 
West Coast states, was designed to preserve white farmers from competition by 
Issei (Japanese immigrant) farmers—who as Asians were barred from naturali-
zation by federal law—and to stigmatize the Issei as undesirables.17  Challenges 
to the constitutionality of the Alien Land Acts by Japanese Americans were de-
feated in the United States Supreme Court during the 1920s.  In Ozawa v. 
United States,18 Terrace v. Thompson,19 and Porterfield v. Webb,20 the Court ruled 
 
 11. Id. at 216. 
 12. Michael Jones-Correa has argued cogently that the rule expounded in Korematsu came about 
in a sense by accident, in that the majority wished to “attenuate the shocking nature” of its holding in 
the case by marking off its decision in that particular case as exceptional, and that otherwise the justices 
would never have agreed to such an explicit formulation.  Michael Jones-Correa, The Origins and Dif-
fusion of Racial Restrictive Covenants, 115 POL. SCI. Q. 451 (2001). 
 13. 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
 14. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
 15. 328 U.S. 373 (1946). 
 16. On the non-use of Carolene Products see Felix Gilman, “The Famous Footnote Four: A History 
of the Carolene Products Footnote,” 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 163, 186-91 (2004). 
 17. See ROGER DANIELS, THE POLITICS OF PREJUDICE 58-64 (1962). 
 18. 260 U.S. 178 (1922). 
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that Congress could constitutionally make rational distinctions in the classifica-
tion of aliens such that some were eligible for citizenship and others not, and 
that the states did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in limiting agricultural land ownership to citizens and aliens eligi-
ble for citizenship.21  As a result of the law, Issei farmers were forced either to 
depend on white friends to buy and hold their land for them or to place the title 
to their land in the names of their American-born children, who were citizens.  
This was a gray area at the very least, as the law provided that any property ac-
quired or transferred “with intent to prevent, evade, or avoid” the statute’s pro-
visions would “escheat” to the state as of the date of acquisition.  Section 9(a) 
of the law (the product of a 1920 amendment), made explicit the legal presump-
tion of such intent whenever an ineligible alien paid for land that was trans-
ferred to a citizen or eligible alien.22 
The Alien Land Acts remained largely unenforced throughout the 1920s 
and 1930s.  In the words of a contemporary commentator, “Legal loopholes, 
administrative inactivity, and public indifference enabled Japanese aliens to cir-
cumvent many of the prohibitions.”23  However, during World War II, white 
Californians lobbied for strict enforcement of the statute to discourage return to 
the state of incarcerated Japanese Americans.  In 1944 and 1945, as Japanese 
Americans began preparing to leave the camps, the California legislature ap-
propriated money for the State’s Attorney General to initiate escheat proceed-
ings to take land purchased with the funds of Japanese American aliens away 
from its owners.  Even though by 1946 there were barely ten thousand “aliens 
ineligible to citizenship” farming in California, most of whom were elderly, 
these escheat proceedings were enormously damaging to all Japanese Ameri-
cans.  Title companies refused to insure Japanese American farmland, except at 
exorbitant rates, and numerous families lost their land or were forced to pay 
large sums to the state government (usually half the assessed value of the land) 
in order to be left alone.24  In all, fifty-nine escheat actions were brought by the 
state of California against Japanese aliens in the five years after 1942, compared 
with fourteen in the previous thirty years. 
B. Background to the Case and the Lower Court Suits 
In early 1945, Fred and Kajiro Oyama brought a legal challenge to the Alien 
Land Act.  Fred was a Nisei  from the San Clemente area who had been given 
two small parcels of land bought by Kajiro, his Issei father, during the 1930s.  
The Oyamas were forced to leave their land in spring 1942, when West Coast 
 
 19. 263 U.S. 197 (1923). 
 20. 263 U.S. 225 (1923). 
 21. On development and constitutional aspects of Alien Land Laws, see, e.g., MORITOSHI 
FUKUDA, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF JAPANESE AMERICANS 123-91 (1980). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Comment, “The Alien Land Laws—a Reappraisal,” 56 YALE L.J. 1017, 1018 (1947). 
 24. BILL HOSOKAWA, NISEI: THE QUIET AMERICANS 447-48 (1969). 
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Japanese Americans were evacuated.  While the Oyamas were away, State At-
torney General Robert Kenny commenced an escheat proceeding, claiming that 
the land had been transferred to Fred in order to evade the Alien Land Act.25  
Upon their return to California, the Oyamas, along with their neighbors Kaza-
buro Koda and Shichinosuke Asano, organized the Society for the Promotion 
of Japanese-American Civil Rights to fund a test case.26  The Oyamas’ case was 
taken up by JACL Counsel A.L. Wirin, a white Jewish lawyer who also was 
head of the Southern California branch of the American Civil Liberties Union, 
and by Hugh E. MacBeth, Sr., an African American lawyer from Los Angeles 
who had worked with the JACL’s legal committee on the organization’s amicus 
brief in Korematsu.  In February 1945, the case of People v. Oyama, together 
with a companion case, People v. Hirose, was argued in the San Diego County 
Superior Court.  In their Memorandum of Law, Wirin and MacBeth argued that 
even if the Alien Land Act had been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 
1920s, “many living waters have [since] run under the bridges of the Constitu-
tion”; the times and circumstances had changed sufficiently that these decisions 
no longer were controlling.27  Moreover, the Alien Land Act was conceived in 
race prejudice and penalized the defendants solely because of race, and was 
thereby unconstitutional.  In an overt reference to the Korematsu case, then less 
than two months old, Wirin and MacBeth asserted that “Discrimination be-
cause of race is constitutionally justified only when required by pressing public 
necessity, under circumstances of direct emergency and peril.”28 
In March 1945 Superior Court Judge Charles G. Haines ruled against the 
Oyamas, on the grounds that he was bound by the earlier decisions of the 
courts.  Haines’s opinion implicitly rejected the imposition of a higher standard 
of scrutiny for racial classifications: “Whether in view of changed views on the 
subject of race, classifications stressing that consideration have ceased to be rea-
sonable in such a sense as to render them obnoxious to limitations expressed in 
the Federal Constitution, is a question not very appropriate for consideration 
by a trial court.”29 
C. The California Supreme Court Ruling 
Shortly thereafter, Wirin appealed People v. Oyama to the California Su-
preme Court. MacBeth withdrew from the case at this point, for reasons that 
 
 25. Unlike the overwhelming majority of West Coast Japanese Americans, the Oyamas were not 
confined in a camp.  They were able to migrate to Utah during the short period during Spring 1942 
when such “voluntary evacuation” was permissible.  It was during their stay in Utah that the Oyama 
family learned of the escheat proceeding.  Telephone interview with Fred Oyama (September 2004). 
 26. Yukio Morita, “The Japanese Americans in the United States Between 1945 and 1965, at 47-55 
(1967) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Ohio State University) (on file with Young Research Library, Univer-
sity of California, Los Angeles). 
 27. A.L. Wirin, article for THE OPEN FORUM, February 24, 1945, attached draft to letter, A.L. 
Wirin to Clifford Forster, February 19, 1945.  Alien Land law, Japanese Americans file, microfilm pa-
pers of the American Civil Liberties Union, Library of Congress [hereinafter ACLU PAPERS]. 
 28. Id. 
 29. American Civil Liberties Union Bulletin, No, 1170 (March 19, 1945), in ACLU PAPERS. 
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are not clear.  Meanwhile, the Civil Rights Defense Union of California, a fledg-
ling Japanese American group organized to fight escheat cases, commissioned 
San Francisco Attorney James Purcell (who had represented Mitsuye Endo in 
her successful habeas corpus case challenging her confinement before the Su-
preme Court) to support Wirin’s efforts.30  The Oyama case was heard in the 
California Supreme Court in March 1946. By this time, prewar and wartime 
public hostility to Japanese Americans on the West Coast had eased.  A federal 
judge in Orange County struck down segregated schools for Mexican Ameri-
cans, citing the legal principle proclaimed by Stone in the Hirabayashi case as 
authority.31  In November 1946 a voter initiative in California to extend the 
Alien Land Act was resoundingly defeated at the polls.  Nevertheless, a few 
days before the election the California Supreme Court issued a decision that 
upheld the escheat actions.  Although the right of a minor American citizen to 
receive and hold property from an alien ineligible to citizenship had been estab-
lished in the 1922 California Supreme Court case Estate of Tetsubumi Yano,32 the 
California court largely ignored in its ruling the impact of the law on Fred 
Oyama.  Rather, the California high court judges, once again citing the United 
States Supreme Court’s 1922–1923 decisions on the Alien Land Act as prece-
dent,33 held that the state’s action in classifying aliens according to eligibility for 
citizenship had a rational basis.34 
D. The Supreme Court Appeal and the Brief 
Following the California court ruling, Wirin, with the aid of both the JACL 
and the ACLU, decided to appeal his case to the United States Supreme Court.  
Purcell and the CRDU withdrew from the case, fearing that the Supreme Court 
would reaffirm its previous holding.35  Instead, Wirin joined forces on the appeal 
with his new law partners, Fred Okrand and former JACL President Saburo 
Kido (who together submitted an amicus in the name of the JACL).  Mean-
while, in hopes of showcasing the case’s importance, he sought an appellate 
lawyer with a national reputation to argue the case before the Supreme Court.  
With the aid of Charles Horsky, a Washington attorney who had put together 
 
 30. Retainer Agreement Signed With Attorneys Purcell and Ferriter, UTAH NIPPO, March 13, 1946. 
 31. Mendez v. Westminster Sch. Dist., 64 F. Supp. 544, 548 (S.D. Cal. 1946).  When the case was 
appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the JACL entered the case as amicus curiae—the first 
case in which the organization intervened on behalf of another minority—arguing that Korematsu, in 
barring classification based on “racial antagonism,” forbade school segregation on grounds of ancestry.  
A. L. Wirin also received permission for the JACL to participate in oral argument on the case.  Al-
though the Ninth Circuit decision narrowed considerably the scope of the lower court ruling, its deci-
sion led California to repeal all school segregation laws.  Toni Robinson & Greg Robinson, Méndez v. 
Westminster: Asian-Latino Coalition Triumphant?, 10 ASIAN L.J. 161, 161-83 (2003). 
 32. 206 P. 995 (1922). 
 33. People v. Oyama, 173 P.2d 794, 800-04 (1946); see also “Statement of Attorney A.L. Wirin on 
California Supreme Court Ruling in the Oyama Test Case,” ACLU Papers. 
 34. FRANK F. CHUMAN, THE BAMBOO PEOPLE: THE LAW AND JAPANESE AMERICANS 80-81 
(1976).  
 35. See Oyama Test Case, PACIFIC CITIZEN, March 5, 1947, at 3:2; CRDU Sudden Act to Drop 
Oyama Case Stirs JACL, RAFU SHIMPO, Feb. 13, 1947, at 1:5-6. 
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the ACLU’s amicus brief in the Korematsu case, the JACL contacted Dean 
Acheson, a distinguished Washington lawyer and former U.S. Undersecretary 
of State (who was shortly to become President Truman’s Secretary of State).  
Acheson agreed to serve without fee as Chief Counsel in oral argument on the 
case, now called Oyama v. California.36 
Wirin and his colleagues retooled their strategy in their appeal to the Su-
preme Court.  Rather than emphasize the rights of aliens in the appellant’s 
brief, the JACL lawyers led off their case by arguing that the Alien Land Act 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights of citizens of Japanese ancestry by 
imposing solely on them, and not on citizens of any other ancestry, the burden 
of proof that any land they received from a parent ineligible to citizenship was 
intended as a gift and was not made in order to avoid escheat under the Alien 
Land Act.37  The JACL attorneys then bolstered their case by means of a “strict 
scrutiny” argument.  Because the Alien Land Act was expressly race-based and 
anti-Japanese, it was not subject to the presumption of constitutionality that the 
Court usually granted to state legislative classifications.  On the contrary, cases 
involving civil liberties, whether they concerned citizens or aliens, faced a more 
rigorous constitutional test than cases involving ordinary commercial transac-
tions.  “Indeed,” Wirin asserted, “the presumption—and it is a strong presump-
tion—is against any ‘race’ legislation.”38  The Court should examine rigorously 
the intent and effect of the law.  As authority for this proposition, Wirin auda-
ciously cited Justice Black’s language in Korematsu v. United States:  “[T]o be-
gin with, . . . all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial 
group are immediately suspect. . . . Pressing public necessity may sometimes jus-
tify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.”39 
 
 36. According to A.L. Wirin, Horsky suggested Acheson because he had lost his first two cases be-
fore the Supreme Court and wished to burnish his reputation.  See Frank Chuman, “Notes on Interview 
With A. L. Wirin,” transcript, December 1971. Box 534, Frank Chuman Papers, Special Collections, 
University of California, Los Angeles.  JACL Secretary Mike Masaoka gave a more colorful version of 
Acheson’s recruitment.  According to Masaoka’s account, he went to see Acheson, who asked how 
much money the JACL could pay.  Masaoka responded, “Five hundred dollars.”  Acheson commented 
that that would scarcely be enough to pay for the record, and he would have to serve without pay, 
whereupon Masaoka quickly responded, “That’s wonderful, Mr. Acheson! You have a client.”  MIKE 
MASAOKA & BILL HOSOKAWA, THEY CALL ME MOSES MASAOKA 213-14 (1987).  Acheson’s presen-
tation was confined to the argument that the Alien Land Act discriminated against American citizens 
of Japanese ancestry.  Oyama Test Case, PACIFIC CITIZEN, November 8, 1947. 
 37. Brief For Petitioners at 7, Oyama, v. California, 322 U.S. 633 (1948) (No. 47-44). 
 38. Id. at 35. 
 39. Id.  One interesting means of tracing the development of Wirin’s position on “strict scrutiny” is 
by comparing the petitioner’s brief with Wirin’s original petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.  
In that document, written in late 1946, Wirin had argued on the basis of Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 
(1945), and other precedents that cases involving civil liberties imposed a more rigid test on state action 
than normal commercial transactions, and that only cases involving a “grave and impending public dan-
ger” could justify such action.  He proceeded to cite the operative passage in Korematsu as support for 
his claim that the impact of the Alien Land Act on aliens of Japanese origin was similar.  However, 
Wirin then immediately retreated from that position and insisted that the Alien Land Law did not even 
meet the usual “reasonable classification” test for constitutionality.  Petition for a writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court of California at 20-21, Oyama, Mike Masaoka Papers, Marriott Library, University of Utah. 
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While the citation of Korematsu in support of civil rights was seemingly un-
precedented in arguments before the Supreme Court, Wirin’s position on “strict 
scrutiny” echoed arguments that had appeared in several law journal articles on 
alien land legislation over the previous months.  For example, Edwin Ferguson, 
one-time solicitor for the WRA, had written in early 1947 that a higher standard 
was necessary in judging alien land law cases: 
[I]t should not be enough to indulge in speculative justifications of the law . . . or to 
plead ignorance of local conditions and the “possibility” of a “rational basis” for the 
legislative judgment.  Restrictive legislation stemming from race prejudice, particu-
larly against a minority that is unable to participate in the political process, calls for [a] 
more searching inquiry.  Such an inquiry would reveal, it is submitted, that the alien 
land law is unjust and unjustifiable legislation, and that it clearly violates the rights 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.40 
E. Oyama v. California—the Majority Opinion 
On January 19, 1948, the Supreme Court handed victory to the plaintiffs by 
a 6-3 margin.  Chief Justice Fred Vinson, in the majority opinion, held that the 
Alien Land Act violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights of citizens of Japa-
nese ancestry.  He therefore found it unnecessary to revisit the earlier cases or 
examine the issue whether Japanese aliens also were entitled to the protection 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  As a result, the Supreme Court’s decision did 
not explicitly overturn the Alien Land Act, though in practice it suspended its 
enforcement in California.  Nevertheless, the Chief Justice left no doubt that 
only a truly “compelling justification” could sustain any racially discriminatory 
statute.41  “There remains the question of whether discrimination between citi-
zens on the basis of their racial descent, as revealed in this case, is justifiable.  
Here we start with the proposition that only the most exceptional circumstances 
can excuse discrimination on that basis in the face of the equal protection 
clause.”42  Furthermore, Vinson declared, the Court had the duty to examine 
whether a law, even if fair on its face, had a discriminatory intent or effect.  
Contrary to the normal practice of appellate courts, the Court could take ac-
count not only of the legal issues involved but of “those factual matters with 
which they are commingled.”43  Thus, the majority of the Court tacitly accepted 
the JACL’s argument that laws involving race or color faced a more rigorous 
 
 40. Edwin E. Ferguson, The California Alien Land Law and the Fourteenth Amendment, 35 CAL. 
L. REV. 61, 89-90 (1947), cited in Land Law Analysis, PACIFIC CITIZEN, June 21, 1947; see also Com-
ment, The Alien Land Laws: A Reappraisal, 56 YALE L.J. 1017, 1017-36 (1947); Dudley O. McGovney, 
The Anti-Japanese Land Laws of California and Ten Other States, 35 CAL. L. REV. 7, 7-60 (1947).  Evi-
dence of the Yale article’s importance is the presence of a marked-up reprint in the file with correspon-
dence with A. L. Wirin and Director Roger Baldwin.  ACLU PAPERS.  Hugh E. MacBeth, Jr., son of 
Hugh E. MacBeth, Sr. and himself a former student of McGovney’s, discussed McGovney’s work with 
A.L. Wirin shortly after the California Supreme Court decision, and recalled that Wirin was particu-
larly impressed with the idea of basing the Supreme Court appeal primarily on the rights of American 
citizens to receive property.  Interview with Hugh E. MacBeth, Jr. (January 2005). 
 41. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640 (1948). 
 42. Id. at 646. 
 43. Id. at 636. 
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test than the Court usually applied to state laws and would now require a show-
ing of exceptional circumstances to justify them.44  The novelty of this position 
was recognized in several law journal articles in the period that followed.45 
F. Oyama v. California—The Concurrences 
Several of the justices went even further in their analysis than Vinson’s ma-
jority opinion.  In a concurrence, Justice Hugo Black stated that the Court 
should have overturned the Alien Land Act because its basic provisions vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in discrimi-
nating against Japanese aliens on racial grounds.  “If there is one purpose of the 
Fourteenth Amendment that is wholly outside the realm of doubt,” the author 
of the Korematsu opinion pointedly commented, “it is that the Amendment was 
designed to bar States from denying to some groups, on account of their race or 
color, any rights, privileges, and opportunities accorded to other groups.”46  In a 
second concurrence, Justice Frank Murphy presented a detailed account of the 
history of California’s Alien Land Act, which he denounced as a blatant expres-
sion of racism and of an “anti-Oriental virus.”47  Murphy cast particular scorn on 
the claims of the Act’s defenders regarding “the alleged disloyalty, clannishness, 
inability to assimilate, racial inferiority and racial undesirability of the Japa-
nese.”48  The uncompromising language of Murphy’s opinion led Justice William 
O. Douglas to send him a curious letter asking him to tone down or withdraw 
the concurrence: 
In Oyama you are 100 per cent right in your position and I would like to join you.  The 
difficulty is that I fear your opinion as written will be translated by the Russians into 
Korean, Chinese and Japanese and widely circulated in the Orient.  The racial preju-
dice represented by the legislation is unmistakable.  But it does not represent the 
viewpoint of the people of our nation. In fact, it does not represent the views of a ma-
jority of Californians.  A few vested interests have put the thing through. But the Rus-
sians will utilize it against all of our people.  That is most unjust. I wanted to submit 
this angle to you for your consideration.49 
 
 44. Id. at 637. 
 45. See, e.g., R.A. Goater, Civil Rights and anti-Japanese Discrimination, 18 U. CIN. L. REV. 81, 81-
89 (1949); Note, Conflict Between Local and National Interests in Alien Landholding Restrictions, 16 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 315, 315-23 (1949); Note, 1947-48 Term of the Supreme Court: The Alien’s Right to Work, 
49 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 257-64 (1949); see also Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Pro-
tection of the Laws,” 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 341-81 (1949). 
 46. Oyama, 332 U.S. at 649. 
 47. Id. at 651 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
 48. Id. at 651, 667.  For a commentary on Murphy’s uncommonly blunt denunciation of racism, see 
Randall Kennedy, Justice Murphy’s Concurrence in Oyama v. California: Cussing Out Racism, 74 TEX. 
L. REV. 1245, 1245-46 (1996).  Klarman mentions Oyama as a relevant case in the history of equal pro-
tection, but he ignores the majority opinion and curiously focuses only (and not altogether accurately) 
on Murphy’s striking down of racial classifications as irrational.  Michael Klarman, An Interpretive His-
tory of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV., 213, 233 (1991). 
 49. Letter from William O. Douglas to Frank Murphy (January 14, 1948) (on file with William O. 
Douglas Papers, Box 161, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.). 
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G. Korematsu and Oyama 
Although the majority opinion did not cite Korematsu, the specter of the 
wartime internment of the Japanese Americans hung over the Supreme Court 
and clearly helped shape the decision.  The Court that decided Oyama was, with 
only two exceptions, the same Court whose members had upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Army curfew and evacuation of people of Japanese ancestry a 
few years before.50  The government’s claims of military necessity and Japanese 
American disloyalty, which the justices had then accepted as sufficient to justify 
the evacuation, were swiftly discredited after the end of the war by commenta-
tors such as Eugene Rostow.51  In the months before the Court rendered its de-
cision, the United States President’s Committee on Civil Rights, in its historic 
report To Secure These Rights, had advocated an investigation of the wartime 
injustice to Japanese Americans and had called for legislation compensating 
them for their losses.52  The Court was very conscious of the connection between 
the discriminatory provisions of the Alien Land Act and the pressures that had 
led to the internment, although Chief Justice Vinson’s majority opinion took 
pains to distinguish the Court’s ruling in Oyama from that in Hirabayashi.  Vin-
son referred to Hirabayashi as a war measure which had presented “exceptional 
circumstances,” contrary to the “general rule” against racial distinctions men-
tioned in that case.53  Still, Justice Murphy, citing his dissenting opinion in Ko-
rematsu, explicitly connected the bigoted attitudes that underlay the Alien Land 
Act with the “misrepresentations, half-truths and distortions” that made up the 
government’s case for evacuation.  Paraphrasing the language of that dissent 
and thereby emphasizing the link, Murphy then called on the Court to overturn 
its previous decisions, since they gave sanction to legalized racism.54 
IV 
THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES 
A. Historical Background 
In addition to defending the rights of Japanese American farmers, both the 
opinion in Oyama and the JACL attorneys who brought the test case would 
 
 50. C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND 
VALUES, 1937–1947, at 283 (1948) (asserting that the Oyama decision represented the Supreme Court’s 
atonement for its mistake in Korematsu).  See generally C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, CIVIL LIBERTIES 
AND THE VINSON COURT (1954). 
 51. Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 489-534 
(1945); see also CAREY MCWILLIAMS, PREJUDICE: JAPANESE-AMERICANS, SYMBOL OF RACIAL 
INTOLERANCE (1944); MINÉ OKUBO, CITIZEN 13660 (1946).  The War Relocation Authority, the gov-
ernment agency responsible for operating the camps, had cast doubt on the necessity for evacuation in 
its official history.  U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, WARTIME EXILE: THE 
EXCLUSION OF THE JAPANESE AMERICANS FROM THE WEST COAST (1946). 
 52. United States President’s Committee on Civil Rights, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS 31, 34 (1947). 
 53. Oyama, 332 U.S. at 646. 
 54. Id. at 671-72. 
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provide strong support for the NAACP’s contemporaneous fight against restric-
tive covenants.  Restrictive covenants—reciprocal promises by groups of home-
owners, usually included in the deeds to their homes—then expressed the prom-
ise not to sell or rent those homes to members of minority or “colored” groups 
such as blacks, Native Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans, and Jews, and to 
make future buyers’ signing the covenants an express condition of sale.  The 
covenants were effective means of perpetuating housing segregation in urban 
areas.  The U.S. Supreme Court had previously rejected an attack on the consti-
tutionality of restrictive covenants in Corrigan v. Buckley.55  Because the cove-
nants were private agreements, the Court held, they did not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibited racial dis-
crimination only by state governments.56 
During the postwar years, when housing shortages were chronic, however, 
restrictive covenants cut sharply into the total housing available for minority 
groups and fostered extreme overcrowding in ghetto areas.  This made them a 
crucial public policy issue.  In 1946, the NAACP and its allies again sought to 
disarm restrictive covenants by bringing lawsuits on behalf of the African 
American buyers and renters of houses covered by restrictive covenants and on 
behalf of would-be white sellers, all of whom had been enjoined in state court 
by the owners of other houses subject to the covenants who sought to enforce 
the covenants, vacate the sales, and evict the buyers and renters.  When a St. 
Louis case, Shelley v. Kraemer, and a Detroit case, McGhee v. Sipes, ended in 
defeat for the NAACP plaintiffs in their respective state supreme courts, 
NAACP lawyers successfully petitioned for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, which consolidated the two cases under the title Shelley v. Kraemer.57  
NAACP lawyers hoped to persuade the Court that even if restrictive covenants 
were private agreements, judicial enforcement of them by state courts consti-
tuted discriminatory state action, which violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Supreme Court also agreed to hear Hurd v. 
Hodge,58 a case that involved a restrictive covenant in the District of Columbia, 
where the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply.59 
B. Loren Miller, A.L. Wirin, and the NAACP Brief 
In its preparation for the briefs in the restrictive covenant cases, the 
NAACP turned to Los Angeles lawyer Loren Miller, a recognized expert on the 
 
 55. 271 U.S. 323 (1926). 
 56. The classic study of restrictive covenants, although it does not mention the role of Japanese 
Americans, is CLEMENT VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP, AND THE 
RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES (1959); see also Michael Jones-Correa, The Origins and Diffusion of 
Racial Restrictive Covenants, 115 POL. SCI. Q. 541, 541-68 (2000). 
 57. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 58. 334 U.S. 24 (1948). 
 59. LOREN MILLER, THE PETITIONERS: THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES AND THE NEGRO 321-26 (1966); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: 
THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 85-90 (1994). 
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subject of housing discrimination, who in turn sought assistance from his long-
time ally A.L. Wirin.60  In December 1945, Miller had won the first victory over 
restrictive covenants, successfully defending Ethel Waters and a number of 
other black entertainers who had bought houses in Los Angeles’s West Adams 
Heights district from eviction under a restrictive covenant. Superior Court 
Judge Thurmond Clarke had ruled in that case that the restrictive covenants in 
and of themselves violated the Fourteenth Amendment.61   
Following the decision, Wirin, who had long been involved in fighting re-
strictive covenants on behalf of the ACLU, persuaded the JACL to support a 
multi-ethnic struggle against restrictive covenants in the Los Angeles area.  In 
1946 Miller and Wirin began a widely publicized and ultimately triumphant 
campaign against restrictive covenants on publicly owned land in South Pasa-
dena.62  However, Wirin’s experience was initially less successful than Miller’s 
had been.  In 1946, with legal advice from Miller, the JACL sponsored a pair of 
suits, Kim v. Superior Court and Amer v. Superior Court.  These involved, re-
spectively, a Chinese American and a Korean American ex-GI, each of whom 
had purchased homes subject to restrictive covenants excluding “Mongolians.”  
In August 1947, the California Supreme Court upheld enforcement of both re-
strictive covenants in question.63 
After securing Miller’s assistance, the NAACP scheduled a conference in 
Chicago over Labor Day weekend 1947.  The purpose of the conference, which 
was attended by civil rights lawyers and representatives of liberal organizations 
from all over the country, was to formulate strategies for fighting Shelley v. 
Kraemer and Hurd v. Hodge, the restrictive covenant cases then pending before 
the Supreme Court.  In the end, the consensus of the conferees was that the 
NAACP should prepare a “Brandeis brief”—a brief that concentrated less on 
legal precedent than on presenting sociological and statistical data (in this case, 
on the negative effects of restrictive covenants).  In pursuit of this plan, the 
NAACP distributed supporting materials to representatives of the other ethnic 
groups for them to use in writing amicus curiae briefs that would contain data 
on the harmful and degrading effects of restrictive covenants.64  Wirin, attending 
the conference, reminded his colleagues that the Oyama case would soon be 
 
 60. For Miller’s expertise, see LOREN MILLER, “RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS V DEMOCRACY,” IN 
MILLER AND MOST REVEREND BERNARD J. SHEIL, RACIAL RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, (Chicago 
Council Against Racial and Religious Discrimination, 1946); Loren Miller, Covenants in the Bear Flag 
State, 35 THE CRISIS 138, 138-40, 153 (1946).  For Miller and Wirin, see letter from Thurgood Marshall 
to Loren Miller (February 13, 1947) (on file with Loren Miller, Restrictive Covenant Files, Legal File, 
NAACP Papers). 
 61. Month in Building News, THE ARCHITECTURAL FORUM (1946). 
 62.  See Housing Segregation Suit Lost by Pasadena FPHA, RAFU SHIMPO, July 26, 1947, at 1:5-6. 
 63.  Chinese Vet Fights Against Restrictive Covenants, RAFU SHIMPO, May 15, 1956, at 1:3-4; Cali-
fornia Supreme Court Upholds Housing Covenants, RAFU SHIMPO, August 22, 1947, at 1:5-6; High 
Court Ruling Hurts Minorities, L. A. TRIB., August 20, 1947, at 1:6. 
 64. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 253-55 (1976). 
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heard, and it was agreed that the link between the Alien Land Act and restric-
tive covenants should be underlined.65 
C. The JACL Amicus and the Asian Restrictive Covenant cases 
No doubt hoping to follow up on this proposal, the JACL decided after the 
conference ended to submit to the Court an amicus curiae brief in support of 
the NAACP that would provide information on restrictive covenants against 
Japanese Americans.  On September 16, 1947, Ina Sugihara, a Nisei active in 
the New York branch of the JACL who had attended the conference as a repre-
sentative of the Protestant Council of New York City (and reported on it for 
The Pacific Citizen), wrote Marian Wynn Perry of the NAACP to inform her 
that the National JACL wished to file an amicus brief in the restrictive covenant 
cases, but that it needed information on how to file such a brief since it had 
never done one before.66  Perry sent the requested materials to JACL Secretary 
Masao Satow and enclosed a note saying, “We are very happy you are going to 
join with us in these cases.”67  The firm of Wirin, Kido and Okrand then began 
work on the brief.  Frank Chuman, a Nisei former camp inmate who was the 
firm’s new associate, did much of the initial drafting. 
Meanwhile, Miller and Wirin together petitioned the Supreme Court to 
grant certiorari in the Kim and Amer cases, and they filed a separate amicus 
brief in the name of the JACL urging the Court to hear the two cases because 
they illustrated how restrictive covenants affected racial groups other than Afri-
can Americans.68  On October 31, 1947, Wirin wrote Thurgood Marshall, asking 
that the NAACP also file an amicus brief in support of granting certiorari in 
Kim and Amer.69  Although Marshall privately expressed his gratitude for 
Wirin’s efforts to bring Kim and Amer as support for the NAACP, he seems not 
to have drafted the requested amicus brief—no doubt he had too much on his 
plate already.70  In the end, the Court did not immediately grant certiorari in ei-
 
 65. Minutes of discussion, Sunday afternoon, Shelley v. Kraemer lawyer Conference, Restrictive 
Covenant Files, NAACP Papers, Series II, Library of Congress [hereinafter NAACP Papers]. 
 66. Letter from Ina Sugihara to Marian Wynn Perry (September 16, 1947) (on file with NAACP 
Papers, Japanese (Nisei) file).  The reasons for the JACL’s ignorance regarding amicus curiae briefs are 
not clear.  The organization already had submitted such a brief to the Supreme Court in the Korematsu 
case and had intervened in the Méndez v. Westminster case (see note 31, supra) and others, including a 
restrictive covenant case involving African Americans in New York.  Deplore Racial Ban in Housing, 
RAFU SHIMPO, January 11, 1947. 
 67. Letter from Marian Wynn Perry to Masao Satow (September 18, 1947) (on file with NAACP 
Papers, Japanese (Nisei) file). 
 68. Add New “Color” to Supreme Court Case, THE OPEN FORUM, Vol. 24, No. 21 (October 18, 
1947), 1:2. 
 69. Letter from A.L. Wirin to Thurgood Marshall (October 31, 1947) (on file with NAACP Papers, 
Japanese (Nisei) file); letter from A.L. Wirin to Thurgood Marshall (December 16, 1947) (on file with 
NAACP Papers, Japanese (Nisei) file). 
 70. Letter from Thurgood Marshall to Roger Baldwin (December 30, 1947) (on file with NAACP 
Papers, Japanese (Nisei) file). 
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ther Kim or Amer, and the decisions in Shelley v. Kraemer and Hurd v. Hodge 
eventually mooted those two cases.71 
The JACL’s brief in the restrictive covenant cases  (which, for reasons that 
are not clear, was nominally addressed only to Hurd v. Hodge) was filed on De-
cember 1, 1947.  In it, Wirin, Kido, Okrand, and Chuman described how restric-
tive covenants were used to discriminate against Japanese Americans, making it 
impossible for Nisei veterans to find housing for their families and forcing citi-
zens of Japanese ancestry to live in overcrowded and unhealthy “little Tokyo” 
areas.72 Charles H. Houston, attorney for Hurd, apparently believed that the in-
formation presented by the JACL about restrictive covenants in South Pasa-
dena and the attempts to turn the South San Francisco peninsula into an all-
white area was of sufficient importance that he cited the JACL brief in the peti-
tioner’s reply brief in Hurd.  No other amicus received a similar compliment.73 
D. The Justice Department Amicus 
During Fall of 1947, twenty-eight organizations filed amicus briefs support-
ing the NAACP’s position in Shelley v. Kraemer and Hurd v. Hodge.  Many of 
these, such as the ACLU and the American Jewish Congress, were groups that 
had filed amicus briefs in Oyama.  One crucial supporter, the United States Jus-
tice Department, had not.74  In November 1947, U.S. Attorney General Tom 
Clark agreed to have the federal government file an amicus brief against the en-
forcement of restrictive covenants.  Clark’s decision was heavily publicized, 
since it marked the first time the Justice Department had ever intervened as 
amicus curiae in a civil rights case.  The decision to file a brief was the product 
of a complex set of factors, including political calculation regarding the upcom-
ing presidential election, internal lobbying by officials in the Justice Depart-
ment and the Indian Bureau (which opposed restrictive covenants against Na-
tive Americans), and the Report of the President’s Committee on Civil Rights, 
which called for the banning of restrictive covenants.75  The treatment of the 
Japanese Americans also may have played a role in Clark’s decision.  Clark had 
 
 71. Id.; see also Supreme Court Declares Restrictive Covenant Out, RAFU SHIMPO, May 3, 1948 at 
1:5-6. 
 72. National JACL Will Enter Restrictive Covenant Cases Before U.S. Supreme Court, PACIFIC 
CITIZEN, September 29, 1947. 
 73. Brief of the Japanese American Citizens League, amicus curiae, Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) 
at 8, cited in Hurd reply brief at 6.  Houston also referred during oral argument to the Kim and Amer cases. 
 74. There is some evidence that the Justice Department considered and rejected the filing of such a 
brief in the Oyama case.  See Remarks by Phineas Indritz, in Minutes of Discussion, Sunday Morn-
ing, Shelley v. Kraemer Lawyer Conference, Restrictive Covenant Files, NAACP Papers.  See also Let-
ter from Philleo Nash to David K. Niles (April 8, 1947) (on file with Philleo Nash papers, Harry S. 
Truman Library, Independence, MO, Correspondence file). 
 75. On Clark’s role in the government’s decision to file an amicus, see KLUGER, supra note 64, at 
252-53; Philip Elman (Interviewed by Norman Silber), The Solicitor General’s Office, Justice Frank-
furter, and Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817, 818-20 (1987). 
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been a central participant in formulating the West Coast evacuation policy dur-
ing Spring 1942, and he later publicly expressed his remorse over his actions.76 
In any event, the government’s amicus brief, which declared that judicial en-
forcement of restrictive covenants was contrary to the public policy of the 
United States, referred prominently to the wartime Japanese American cases in 
its argument.  It cited not only the language from Hirabayashi about race-based 
distinctions in law being “odious to a free people,” but also quoted, as the 
JACL had done shortly before in its Oyama brief, from the passage in the Ko-
rematsu opinion to describe the “attitude” the Supreme Court should adopt in 
dealing with state action based on racial distinctions: 
[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immedi-
ately suspect.  That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional.  It is to 
say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.  Pressing public necessity 
may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.77 
The government’s brief concluded that since distinctions based on race or color 
were constitutionally invidious and could be justified, if at all, only by “the 
weightiest countervailing interests,” the Court should make the most searching 
inquiry into the sufficiency of any grounds asserted to justify racially discrimina-
tory legislation.78  The government asked the Court to apply this doctrine and 
thereby strike down judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants.79 
E. Shelley and Hurd  
On May 3, 1948, the Court issued its decisions in Shelley v. Kraemer and 
Hurd v. Hodge.  By a 6-0 margin (Justices Reed, Jackson, and Rutledge recused 
themselves from both cases, presumably because they owned property subject 
to restrictive covenants), the Court determined that restrictive covenants based 
on race or ancestry violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and were thereby unenforceable in the courts.80  Chief Justice Vin-
son’s unanimous opinion in Shelley relied heavily on his recent majority opinion 
in Oyama (which it cited in two places), particularly in its central conclusion, 
namely that any government action “which denied equal enjoyment of property 
rights to a designated class of citizens of specified race and ancestry, was not a 
legitimate exercise of the state’s police power but violated the guaranty of the 
equal protection of the laws.”81  While the petitioners in Shelley and Hurd were 
African Americans—although Hurd himself insisted he was a Mohawk In-
 
 76. See, e.g., Tom C. Clark, Preface, to CHUMAN, supra note 34, at vii. 
 77. Brief for the United States as amicus curiae at 48, 53, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) 
(Nos. 47-72, 47-87, 47-290, 47-291). 
 78. Id. at 54 
 79. Id. Solicitor General Philip Perlman reaffirmed this position when he stated during oral argu-
ment before the Supreme Court that restrictive covenants affected “the lives, health and well-being of 
not only millions of Negroes but of Jews, Chinese and Japanese.”  There was no detectible irony in the 
Justice Department’s use of the Korematsu case, which it had defended barely two years earlier, to 
press the Court to defend equal rights for minorities, including Japanese Americans. 
 80. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 81. Id. at 21. 
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dian82—the Court acknowledged in a footnote its understanding that restrictive 
covenants were used to discriminate against various groups, including “Japa-
nese.”83  Indeed, the covenant at issue in Shelley explicitly banned use by “peo-
ple of the Negro or Mongolian race.”84 
The companion opinion in Hurd reached the same result as Shelley.  How-
ever, since Hurd involved the District of Columbia, whose residents were not 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court reached its decision on 
other grounds.  The plaintiffs had sought to persuade the Court that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment encompassed a guarantee of equal pro-
tection similar to that of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  For this purpose, the Hurd plaintiffs cited both Hirabayashi and 
Korematsu, which had been decided on the basis of the Fifth Amendment.  
However, the Justices were not ready to explore this issue, which they stated 
was unnecessary in order to decide the case.  Instead, the Court premised its 
conclusion on a federal statute, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which had ex-
pressly provided that all citizens had equal rights to “real and personal prop-
erty.”85 
V 
THE TAKAHASHI CASE 
A. Background and Lower Court Decisions 
A third case, Takahashi v. California Fish and Game Commission,86 further 
extended the evolution of strict scrutiny.  Torao Takahashi was one of approxi-
mately 700 licensed Issei commercial fishermen who worked in California in the 
years before World War II.  In 1943, while Takahashi and the rest of the West 
Coast Japanese Americans were incarcerated in camps, the California legisla-
ture amended its Fish and Game Law to bar all “Japanese aliens” from obtain-
ing fishing licenses.  The clear purpose of the new law, which was part of the 
wave of anti-Japanese legislation introduced in the legislature during that year, 
was to express hostility toward the Japanese Americans and to discourage them 
from returning to California following their release from the camps by making 
it impossible for them to practice their trade.  In 1945, amid concerns that the 
statute unconstitutionally singled out Japanese aliens, the legislature amended 
its wording to deny fishing licenses to “aliens ineligible to citizenship,” among 
whom Japanese were effectively the only representatives.  In 1945, after Taka-
hashi returned to California and was denied a fishing license, the JACL and the 
Southern California Japanese Fishermen’s Association together agreed to spon-
 
 82. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 27 n.2 (1948). 
 83. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 21 n.26. 
 84. Id. at 5. 
 85. Hurd, 334 U.S. at 30-31. 
 86. 334 U.S. 410 (1948). 
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sor a test case, and A.L. Wirin, assisted by his partners John Maeno and Saburo 
Kido, served as counsel.87 
Unlike the Oyamas, Takahashi was initially victorious.  In 1946, the Los 
Angeles County Superior Court ruled that Takahashi had a constitutional right 
to fish outside the three-mile belt representing the state’s territorial waters.  
The Superior Court bitingly characterized the law as an effort to conceal anti-
Japanese discrimination, “the thin veil used to conceal a purpose being too 
transparent.”88  The State appealed to the California Supreme Court, which in 
October 1947 overturned the Superior Court’s decision.  By a narrow 4-3 vote, 
the high court ruled that the state had a proprietary interest in the fish in its 
ocean waters and could constitutionally restrict fishing licenses to citizens and 
aliens eligible for citizenship in order to preserve its natural resources.89  This 
decision attracted widespread negative comment in the national press.  The 
President’s Committee on Civil Rights called for the statute’s repeal.90 
B. The Cert Petition and the Search For Allies 
Wirin waited to decide whether to appeal Takahashi until the Court had 
ruled on the Oyama case.91  Once the Court did so, the appeal was a foregone 
conclusion.  The main opinion in Oyama (no doubt in order to build a majority 
more easily) had confined its analysis to citizens and had deliberately avoided 
deciding whether race-based discrimination against aliens violated the Four-
teenth Amendment.  Still, four of the justices in the Oyama majority already 
had joined in concurring opinions stating that discrimination against Japanese 
aliens on the basis of race or ancestry violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Indeed, in his concurring opinion, Justice Black 
had pointed to the statute in Takahashi as an example of such discrimination 
against Japanese aliens.92  Thus, even before the Supreme Court acted on a peti-
tion for certiorari, there appeared to be four justices ready to rule in the JACL’s 
favor. 
Nevertheless, Wirin was taking no chances.  In October 1947, at the same 
time he wrote Thurgood Marshall about the Kim and Amer cases, he also in-
formed Marshall that Takahashi had been decided in California and was being 
appealed to the Supreme Court.  He asked that the NAACP prepare an amicus 
brief in support of granting certiorari.  On December 31, 1947, Samuel Ishikawa 
of the JACL’s Anti-Discrimination Committee met with Marian Wynn Perry of 
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the NAACP and repeated Wirin’s request.  Ishikawa then proposed that the 
NAACP contact the U.S. Attorney General to urge the government to submit 
an amicus brief, as it had in Shelley.93  Solicitor General Philip Perlman, cheered 
by the positive reception of the government’s Shelley brief, was inspired to in-
tervene on behalf of Japanese Americans.94  In February 1948, Perlman wrote to 
the JACL lawyers that the government had decided to file a brief in support of 
their case.  The Takahashi case, Perlman said, “raises civil liberties issues of 
such national importance and affecting such a large number of persons as to 
warrant intervention by the Government.”95  Thus, barely three years after the 
Korematsu decision, the same Justice Department that had defended mass vio-
lation of the civil liberties of Japanese Americans now was officially committed 
to their defense.  Ishikawa thereafter wrote Perry to express the JACL’s grati-
tude to the NAACP for its lobbying of the Attorney General.96 
C. Comparison of the JACL, NAACP, and Justice Department Briefs 
In March 1948, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Takahashi.  The 
NAACP then agreed to submit an amicus brief in support of the JACL.  Both 
the appellant’s brief and the NAACP’s amicus brief, in which the National 
Lawyers Guild joined, argued that the California fishing law denied legal resi-
dents of the United States the opportunity to earn a living in a common occupa-
tion because of their Japanese ancestry.  Like the JACL appellate brief, the 
NAACP brief asserted that the law was racist in purpose and effect (the 
NAACP lawyers pointed out that the fishing law had the same purpose and ef-
fect as the Alien Land Act that the Court had recently addressed in Oyama), 
and thus violated the appellant’s rights to equal protection and due process un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the United Nations Charter.  In addi-
tion, both briefs charged that the California law improperly interfered with the 
supreme right of the federal government to make immigration and foreign pol-
icy, since its primary effect was to exclude aliens legally admitted to the United 
States from residing in the state.97 
Oddly, neither the JACL nor the NAACP lawyers attempted to build on the 
JACL’s contention in its Oyama brief that “pressing public necessity” was re-
quired to constitutionally justify a racially discriminatory statute, even though 
the Court had tacitly accepted this doctrine in its Oyama opinion.  Rather, both 
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the JACL and the NAACP lawyers held to the less rigorous legal standard of 
whether the law’s racial distinctions bore a “rational relationship” to its pur-
pose.  Both briefs devoted much of their argument to demonstrating that there 
was no rational relationship between preventing Japanese aliens from commer-
cial fishing and the state’s ostensible interest in conservation.98 
In contrast, the argument for a higher standard and heightened scrutiny was 
put forward in a short amicus by the Justice Department.  As in its amicus brief 
in Shelley, written two months before, the Department took the position in its 
Takahashi brief that any racial classifications were prima facie invalid and that 
the state had an obligation to justify any race-based legislation under the Four-
teenth Amendment.  Courts meanwhile should subject any purported justifica-
tion to the “most searching inquiry.”  The Justice Department thus called upon 
the Court to exercise heightened scrutiny of the California fishing law because 
it involved a race-based classification, and to overturn it because California 
could not show, as Korematsu demanded, that the law was required by “press-
ing public necessity.”99 
D. Takahashi and its Influence 
On April 22 and 23, 1948, the Court heard oral argument in Takahashi.  As 
in Oyama, Dean Acheson served as Chief Counsel for the JACL.  Six weeks 
later, on June 7, 1948, the Court announced its decision.  The same justices who 
previously had voted with the majorities in Oyama and in Shelley (plus Burton, 
who had dissented in Oyama, and Rutledge, who had recused himself in the re-
strictive covenant cases) struck down the California fishing law.  Justice Black, 
writing for the majority, held that the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment 
extended to aliens as well as citizens.100  Black based his opinion on the rights of 
aliens under the Fourteenth Amendment.  In addition, he agreed with peti-
tioner’s claims that a state law infringed on the federal government’s exclusive 
authority over immigration when it prevented an alien lawfully admitted to the 
United States from earning a living in the same manner as other residents of the 
state.  Finally, Black stated, he was unable to find any “special public interest” 
in support of California’s discriminatory fishing law that would serve as a le-
gitimate basis for upholding it.101  Although he refused to address the question 
whether the law was prompted by racial hostility against the Japanese, he “vig-
orously denied” that it was simply a conservation measure.102  Although Black 
played down the racial aspects of the case, Murphy issued a concurring opinion, 
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 99. Brief for the United States as amicus curiae at 5-6, Takahashi (No. 47-533). 
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as in Oyama, that provided an extended exposition of the anti-Japanese history 
of the fishing law and the racist intent of the lawmakers. 
The Takahashi victory halted California’s long history of legal discrimina-
tion against Japanese aliens, although the Issei did not attain full equality until 
1952, when Congress passed the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act.  The Act 
removed all racial and national restrictions on the naturalization of immigrants, 
thus eliminating in a stroke the category of “aliens ineligible to citizenship.”  A 
far more lasting product of the case was its contribution to the development of 
the “strict scrutiny” doctrine as a weapon in eliminating Jim Crow, as Thurgood 
Marshall recognized in an article published shortly afterwards.103 
VI 
THE SCHOOL SEGREGATION CASES 
A. The NAACP’s Campaign Against Inequality 
By the time the Takahashi case was argued, NAACP lawyers were reaching 
the end stages of a long-term legal assault on racial segregation.  According to 
the Supreme Court’s then-prevailing “separate but equal” doctrine, first enun-
ciated in the 1896 case Plessy v. Ferguson,104 racial segregation was not unconsti-
tutional as long as the separate facilities provided were “substantially equal.”  
Beginning in the 1930s, NAACP lawyers, following a plan developed by Nathan 
Margold, decided that public education would be a promising field for litigation 
because public schools involved a heavy investment by states and because the 
inequalities in segregated education were so apparent.  In the mid-1930s, then-
NAACP Chief Counsel Charles H. Houston decided as a first step to fight edu-
cational inequality without directly addressing Plessy by challenging the exclu-
sion of African Americans from higher education.  Successful court suits would 
establish a record and a momentum in favor of nonsegregated equality by forc-
ing Southern states either to admit blacks to white institutions or maintain a 
prohibitively expensive dual educational system.  In 1938, the NAACP won its 
first Supreme Court victory in the educational field in Missouri ex rel Gaines v. 
Canada.105  The Court ordered the University of Missouri’s Law School to admit 
Lloyd Gaines, an African American, since it maintained no law school for 
blacks.106 
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B. The Postwar Graduate School Cases 
After the end of World War II, the NAACP expanded its efforts to secure 
the admission of African Americans to graduate and law schools.  In 1948, the 
Court issued a per curiam opinion in Sipuel v. Board of Regents of University of 
Oklahoma,107 reaffirming its ruling in Gaines that a state must provide to all per-
sons facilities equal to those it provided for whites, and ordering that it must 
provide those facilities as soon as it did so for whites.  Following this victory, the 
NAACP brought two further cases, McLaurin v. Oklahoma108 and Sweatt v. 
Painter,109 which grew out of the Court’s rulings in Gaines and Sipuel.  McLaurin 
involved an African American who had been admitted to the University of 
Oklahoma’s School of Education, but who, once inside, was made to sit in a 
separate area of his classroom (originally in an alcove, later in a cordoned-off 
row of seats) and restricted to his own special assigned table in the school’s 
cafeteria and library.  Sweatt concerned another African American, Heman 
Marion Sweatt, who had applied for admission to the University of Texas Law 
School.  In order to avoid being forced to admit him, Texas state authorities had 
established a separate law school for blacks in a “temporary” location in the 
basement of the state’s capitol in Austin.110 
C. McLaurin: The NAACP JACL Briefs 
On January 7, 1949, the NAACP held a conference of civil rights lawyers 
and supporting organizations on the upcoming McLaurin and Sweatt cases.  A 
number of liberal, labor, and Jewish groups were invited, with the JACL being 
the only non-black racial minority organization included.111  As in the restrictive 
covenant cases, the NAACP sought to coordinate strategies and encourage the 
writing of amicus briefs.  The JACL complied with a short brief (which was 
formally addressed only to McLaurin) signed by Edward Ennis, the former Jus-
tice Department lawyer who had been named JACL Counsel, as well as by a 
group of fifteen Nisei lawyers listed as “of counsel” (including Minoru Yasui, 
whose conviction for disobeying wartime evacuation orders had been upheld by 
the Supreme Court simultaneously with the Hirabayashi decision).112  The JACL 
brief stated that separate facilities for blacks and other racial minorities were 
never equal in practice and asked the Court to overturn the Plessy “separate 
but equal” doctrine on that basis.  Subtly connecting Jim Crow with the wartime 
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internment cases, the brief further argued that “[d]uring the recent war hostili-
ties an unfortunate and mistaken exercise of the war power involving racial dis-
crimination was allowed as a temporary emergency matter” but that “since the 
end of hostilities racial discrimination by governmental action has been consis-
tently condemned as unconstitutional.”  As evidence of this trend, the brief 
cited Oyama, Shelley, and Takahashi.113 
Meanwhile, in its appellant’s brief in McLaurin, the NAACP lawyers 
adopted for the first time a version of the “strict scrutiny” argument that the 
JACL had first put forward and the Justice Department had subsequently ex-
panded.  The NAACP brief argued that laws involving racial or religious classi-
fications were subject to a special test.  “In the absence of an overwhelming 
public necessity, this Court has never allowed governmental regulation of this 
constitutionally preferred area and has nullified all such unreasonable and irra-
tional classifications.”114  The NAACP contended that in the matter at hand the 
state had not and could not show the clear and “overwhelming public necessity” 
required to legitimize racial classifications.  As the JACL had done in Oyama, 
and the Justice Department had done in Shelley and Takahashi, the NAACP 
held that governmental action based on race or color bore a presumption of un-
constitutionality.  In support of this assertion, it cited large sections from the 
“recent decisions” of Hirabayashi, Korematsu, Oyama, and Takahashi and their 
concurrences to show that “racial distinctions have incurred such constitutional 
odium” as to be “presumptively void.” 
D. McLaurin and Sweatt: The Supreme Court Decisions 
On June 5, 1950, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled in favor of the Afri-
can American petitioners in both McLaurin and Sweatt, finding in both cases 
that the education being offered to the petitioners was not equal to that of 
whites and thus violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause.  Since the Court found that the facilities were unequal, it did not explic-
itly address whether the Plessy doctrine was wrong or irrelevant.  However, sig-
nificantly for the NAACP position, the Court concluded in Sweatt that equality 
of schooling rested in part on “intangible” factors such as a school’s reputation 
and the opportunity to exchange ideas with other students, and in McLaurin 
that no matter how nominal the differences were in the facilities afforded 
McLaurin and those offered to his fellow students, they signified that the state 
set him apart on a racial basis and thus handicapped him in his pursuit of effec-
tive graduate education.115 
 
 113. Id. at 3. 
 114. Brief for Appellant at 30-34, McLaurin (No. 49-34). 
 115. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 
339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
05_ROBINSON_FIXED PROOFS.DOC 11/22/2005  11:32 AM 
52 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 68:29 
E. The School Segregation Cases—Background and Supreme Court Briefs 
The way was now prepared for a direct assault on “separate but equal” in 
the central area of primary education.  This had always been the NAACP’s ul-
timate goal.  The previous graduate school cases had affected only a very few 
people.  The school cases the NAACP prepared to bring would affect thousands 
of children.  In Fall 1950, Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP lawyers directed 
or assisted in bringing five separate lawsuits, which challenged segregation in 
school districts in Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, Delaware, and the District 
of Columbia.  The NAACP provided massive expert witness testimony from 
educators and psychologists on the harmful effects of segregation on African 
American children (notably the famous “doll” experiments of Drs. Mamie and 
Kenneth B. Clark).  In four of the cases, the lower courts ruled that “separate 
but equal” education did not violate the constitutional rights of African Ameri-
cans, even though the Kansas judge found that segregated schools were harmful 
to African American children.  Only in the Delaware case did the local judicial 
authorities order the district schools desegregated.  In 1952, the U.S. Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in all five cases, which were consolidated under the ti-
tle of the Kansas case, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas.116 
The galaxy of appellate briefs submitted by Marshall and his colleagues on 
these cases included an impressive mass of sociological and psychological data.  
Their legal arguments against segregation resembled those in McLaurin and 
Sweatt.  As in those briefs, the NAACP lawyers argued that the Court should 
exercise “strict scrutiny” in judging laws involving race or color.  Since classifi-
cations based on race served no “legitimate state purpose,” they were not de-
fensible.117 
F. Brown v. Board of Education: The Supreme Court Case 
On December 9, 1952, the five cases that collectively comprised Brown v. 
Board of Education were argued in the U.S. Supreme Court.  The Court imme-
diately found itself deadlocked over whether the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vided any basis on which to overrule Plessy v. Ferguson. 118  In order to clarify 
the issues and to gain further time to resolve its own inner conflict, the Court 
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asked the parties to return the following fall for reargument on the question 
whether the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had intended to forbid seg-
regated schools.  In September 1953, as the two sides were preparing their 
briefs, Chief Justice Fred Vinson suddenly died.  His replacement as Chief Jus-
tice was California governor Earl Warren.119  Ironically, during Spring 1942, 
Warren, then California’s Attorney General, had been among the principal in-
stigators of the removal of the Japanese Americans.  Although Warren never 
publicly discussed his wartime actions regarding Japanese Americans in the 
decades that followed, in his last years and in his posthumously published auto-
biography he expressed his profound regret over them.120 
In December 1953, the Brown reargument took place.  In their conference 
afterwards, the justices found a majority in support of overturning Plessy.  In 
the months that followed, Chief Justice Warren prepared the opinion of the 
Court and successfully exerted pressure on potential dissenters to join the ma-
jority (the two most reluctant justices were Jackson and Reed, the dissenters in 
Oyama and Takahashi).121  On May 17, 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court unani-
mously declared that segregated schools violated the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The decision was not based primarily on legal 
precedent but on evolving standards of fair treatment and the demonstrated 
psychological harm imposed on African American children by segregation.  As 
the Court declared in ringing tones:  “We conclude that in the field of public 
education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educa-
tional facilities are inherently unequal.”122 
G. Bolling v. Sharpe and the Establishment of Strict Scrutiny 
Somewhat lost in the glare of attention over the Brown decision was Chief 
Justice Warren’s opinion in the companion case, Bolling v. Sharpe.123  In Bolling, 
as previously in Hurd v. Hodge, the Court had to deal with racial discrimination 
in the District of Columbia, where the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply.  
Unlike in Hurd, however, there was no specific statute that the Court could say 
prohibited racial segregation in the District’s schools.  The brief submitted by 
NAACP lawyer James Nabrit, counsel for the petitioners in Bolling, had taken 
up and built upon the argument previously made by the petitioners in Hurd—
namely, that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment barred racial dis-
tinctions in federal law the same way that the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment did with regard to state law.124  Warren’s opinion relied 
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on this argument.  Although due process and equal protection were not mutu-
ally exclusive, Warren stated, as the first was not as explicit a guarantee as the 
second, both stemmed from “our American ideal of fairness,” and discrimina-
tion barred under equal protection may be so unjustifiable as to violate due 
process.  “Liberty,” he continued, was not confined to “mere freedom from 
bodily restraint.”  Rather, it extended to the “full range of conduct which the 
individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a proper gov-
ernmental objective.”  Since segregation in public schools was not reasonably 
related to any “proper governmental objective,” it imposed an arbitrary depri-
vation on the liberty of African American children that violated the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  In any case, Warren concluded, it would be 
“unthinkable” that the Constitution should impose a lesser duty on the federal 
government than on the states.125 
In support of his assertion that segregation was not related to any legitimate 
governmental purpose, a more exacting standard than the preexisting “rational 
basis” test, Warren’s opinion expressly adopted the “strict scrutiny” doctrine 
that first the JACL, then the Justice Department, and finally the NAACP had 
urged on the Court.  Citing to Korematsu and Hirabayashi in a footnote, with-
out apparent irony, the Chief Justice stated:  “Classifications based solely upon 
race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our tra-
ditions and hence constitutionally suspect.”  Almost ten years after World War 
II, the man who had done so much to deprive West Coast Japanese Americans 
of their liberty used the cases that endorsed those shameful actions as support 
for ending a shameful era of segregation in the nation’s public schools.126 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
Both the Supreme Court’s rejection of the “separate but equal” rule in 
Brown and its adoption of the “strict scrutiny” doctrine in Bolling are land-
marks in American history.  Since 1954, the “strict scrutiny” doctrine has be-
come central to the Supreme Court’s approach to racial issues.  During the 
1950s and 1960s, the Court relied on “strict scrutiny” to strike down state and 
local segregation laws, as well as to remove restrictions on the rights of African 
Americans to vote (even as in more recent years it has served as the basis for 
the Court’s rulings against affirmative action and preferential treatment for ra-
cial minorities).  
The role of the Korematsu case as both precedent and warning in the evolu-
tion of equal protection deserves further attention.  It is a historical irony that 
Korematsu, whose practical impact (as compared to the Court’s simultaneous 
ruling in the Endo case) was effectively nil, should have had such a full and con-
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tentious afterlife.127  Furthermore, the postwar Japanese American cases, and 
the role of Japanese Americans in the restrictive covenant cases, have been un-
justly ignored in the history of civil rights in the United States.  A.L. Wirin, in 
later years, stated that the Oyama and Takahashi cases were the most important 
he had ever handled “because they were able to establish principles which were 
the forerunners of the United States Supreme Court cases involving Negroes 
and affording them the rights to equal treatment and equal protection of the 
law under the [Fourteenth] Amendment.”128  The critical place of these cases in 
the development of the strict scrutiny doctrine reminds us, once again, how 
richly the struggles of Japanese Americans have contributed to building the edi-
fice of American freedom. 
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